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Using a sample of control cross-border acquisitions from 61 countries from 1990 to 2007, we find
that acquirers from countries with better governance gain more from such acquisitions and their gains
are higher when targets are from countries with worse governance. Other acquirer country characteristics
are not consistently related to acquisition gains. For instance, the anti-self-dealing index of the acquirer
has opposite associations with acquirer returns depending on whether the acquisition of a public firm
is paid for with cash or equity. Strikingly, global effects in acquisition returns are at least as important
as acquirer country effects. First, the acquirer’s industry and the year of the acquisition explain more
of the stock-price reaction than the country of the acquirer. Second, for acquisitions of private firms
or subsidiaries, acquirers gain more when acquisition returns are high for acquirers from other countries.
We find strong evidence that better alignment of interests between insiders and minority shareholders
is associated with greater acquirer returns and weaker evidence that this effect mitigates the adverse
impact of poor country governance.
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There is a vast literature showing that a country’s governance is related to characteristics of its 
financial markets as well as of its firms. In particular, countries with better governance are countries with 
more developed financial markets, more initial public offerings, less unmet financing requirements, 
greater valuation of cash held by investors, and so on.
1  We expect corporate investments in countries 
with better governance to increase shareholder wealth more. In particular, shareholders in countries with 
better governance should be better able to protect themselves against expropriation by insiders, by the 
state, as well as by other parties. Further, investments by corporations should face fewer obstacles in 
countries where the government works better, regulation is less burdensome, and corruption is weaker. 
However, firms can also take actions that offset the weaknesses of their country’s governance. For 
instance, greater insider ownership can help align interests between insider and minority shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002) and cross-listing enables firms to rent 
institutions from countries with better governance and investor protection (Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999). As 
a result of these opposing effects, it is an empirical issue whether and how a country’s governance affects 
the extent to which investments create wealth for shareholders.  
In this paper, we investigate whether a country’s governance explains the shareholder wealth created 
by investment decisions by studying the stock-price reaction to cross-border control acquisitions. 
Acquisitions are typically the largest discrete operating investments firms make (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). Cross-border acquisitions offer an ideal setting to study this issue. The cross-border acquisitions 
firms make are typically acquisitions that are available to firms from many countries, so the price a firm 
pays for an acquisition is generally set in a global market. Cross-border acquisitions make it possible, 
therefore, to separate the investment decision from the investment opportunity set in a way that is not be 
possible for domestic acquisitions. Importantly, this separation enables us to focus more directly on the 
country governance of the acquiring firm. In the absence of this separation, it is difficult to separate the 
impact of country governance on the acquirer versus its impact on the target. In this paper, we can 
                                                            
1 See Olsen (1996) on the importance and implications of country governance.  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (2002) review some of the literature from the perspective that the key determinant of country 
governance is a country’s legal origin. The result on the value of cash is in Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006).  2 
 
identify separately the impact of acquiring-firm country governance and target-firm country governance. 
We find, for the whole sample of acquisitions, the gains to acquiring-firm shareholders are higher in 
countries with better governance and firms in such countries make more acquisitions.   
We construct a sample of 37,414 control acquisitions by firms in 61 countries from 1990 to 2007. Out 
of these acquisitions, 8,090 are cross-border acquisitions. It is not surprising that most acquisitions are 
domestic. It is well-known in the acquisitions literature that the returns to acquiring-firm shareholders 
from acquisitions differ depending on the type of acquisition (see, for instance, Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller, 2002). We therefore consider all types of acquisitions together as well as each type of 
acquisition separately. Acquisitions of private firms constitute the most frequent type of acquisitions both 
domestically and cross-border. The relative frequency of acquisitions paid for with stock is much lower 
for cross-border acquisitions than for domestic acquisitions. Strikingly, we show that, for all acquisitions 
except acquisitions of public firms for cash, there is no difference in the average stock-price reaction to 
domestic acquisitions and cross-border acquisitions. In the case of acquisitions of public firms for cash, 
we find that cross-border acquisitions have an abnormal return that is greater by 0.56%. As in the 
literature for U.S. acquisitions, all types of acquisitions but those of public firms paid for with common 
stock generate a positive stock-price reaction.  
We investigate next how country governance and other country characteristics are related to acquirer 
shareholder returns. We expect better country governance to lead to acquisitions that benefit shareholders 
for several reasons. First, better governance makes it less likely that proceeds from investments will be 
expropriated by the state, insiders, stakeholders, or others. Second, it makes it harder for insiders to make 
investments that benefit them at the expense of shareholders. Third, better country governance gives an 
advantage to firms in creating synergies through acquisitions. For example, poor respect for the rule of 
law and poor control of corruption have an adverse impact on how well a firm conducts its operations. As 
a result, a firm from a country with good governance that acquires a firm from a country with poor 
governance can make the target more efficient. We use as our main measures of country governance the 
World Governance Indicators published by the World Bank (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
[KKM], 2009). These indices are time-varying and are obtained by averaging a large number of surveys. 3 
 
They measure separately how well a country controls corruption, the respect for the rule of law, the 
degree of political stability, the effectiveness of government, regulatory quality, and how well a country’s 
citizens can participate in selecting the government and the extent to which they enjoy various freedoms. 
We investigate the relation between acquirer gains and each one of the individual indices as well as with 
the aggregate index for the acquirer’s country. For the whole cross-border sample, the average acquirer 
abnormal return is 1.5%. A one standard deviation increase in the average country governance index 
increases the stock-price reaction by 23 basis points, or 14.97%. We find that, in general, acquirer gains 
increase with better control of corruption, better rule of law, and better government effectiveness in the 
acquirer’s country. In addition, the acquirer gain for acquisitions of public firms for cash increase 
significantly with these three indices as well, but also increase strongly with the index of government 
stability. The effect of a one standard deviation increase in the average governance index on the abnormal 
return for acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash is an increase of 60.65%. In multiple regressions, 
country governance of the acquirer has a positive significant coefficient for the whole sample, for cash 
acquisitions of public and private firms, and for stock acquisitions of private firms.  
We investigate other country characteristics expected to be related to the gains shareholders make 
from acquisitions. We find that the stock-price reaction to acquisitions of public firms for cash increases 
in an economically significant way with the acquiring country’s accounting transparency and its anti-self-
dealing index, an index that measures the ability of insiders to engage in self-dealing transactions (see 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003), but acquiring-firm returns for acquisitions of 
public firms paid for with equity fall with the anti-self-dealing index.  Though the literature has devoted 
considerable attention to the role of the anti-director index in the frequency of acquisitions and in merger 
premiums since Rossi and Volpin (2004), we find no evidence that acquirers from countries with a higher 
anti-director index gain more from acquisitions. Characteristics related to a country’s economic or 
financial development are typically not significant.  
In all our regressions, we include a country characteristic both for the acquirer’s country and for the 
target’s country. A striking result is that the coefficient of the characteristic for the target’s country has 
often the opposite sign of the coefficient for the acquirer’s country. Most importantly given our focus, the 4 
 
coefficient on the governance index of the target’s country is generally negative, so that the gain from 
acquisitions for acquiring-firm shareholders is generally lower if the acquisition is made in a country with 
better governance. This result implies that the benefits of good country governance are portable, in that a 
firm from a country with good governance carries the benefits of that good governance with it when it 
goes abroad.  
The results we have discussed generally hold in many different regression specifications. In 
particular, we estimate regressions with only one country characteristic at a time as well as with multiple 
country characteristics. We would expect firm and deal characteristics to be endogenous to country 
characteristics. We therefore estimate regressions without firm and deal characteristics as well as 
regressions with these characteristics. Our main results hold in all of these specifications.  
We then explore whether two firm-level governance choices, namely insider ownership and the 
choice of an ADR program, mitigate the effect of poor country governance. Though there is evidence that 
corporate control mechanisms affect acquirer returns in the U.S. (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007), U.S. 
evidence on the relation between bidder returns and insider ownership is mixed (for instance, while 
Hubbard and Palia (1995) find a nonlinear relation between bidder returns and managerial ownership, 
Loderer and Martin (1997) find no relation). In contrast, we find strong evidence that acquirer returns 
increase with insider ownership in our cross-country sample. The economic significance of a one standard 
deviation increase in insider ownership for the whole sample is an increase of 18% in the acquirer return. 
There is some evidence that the benefit from insider ownership decreases as the quality of a country’s 
governance increases, but this evidence is significant only for acquisitions of private firms. Surprisingly, 
the existence of an ADR program is negatively related to returns of acquisitions of public firms for stock. 
A possible explanation is that the information environment is better for ADR firms (see Bailey, Karolyi, 
and Salva, 2006), so that stock issuance has more signaling value for such firms.    
As Black (2000) observes, merger waves have become global. The frequency of cross-border 
acquisitions shows that there is a global market for control. We would therefore expect global factors to 
affect the gains from acquisitions and the frequency of acquisitions. To capture global effects, we first use 
year and industry indicator variables. For the whole sample, we find that these indicator variables have 5 
 
more explanatory power than country characteristics, suggesting that global determinants of stock-price 
reactions to acquisitions are important. We show further that an acquirer’s return for an acquisition is 
related to acquirer returns in other countries for the same type of transaction and form of payment. This 
effect is strong for the whole sample and for acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries; it is not for 
acquisitions of public firms.  
If a country’s governance is a valuable input in the production function of firms, we would expect 
firms from countries with poor governance to find it more difficult to compete for acquisitions. As a 
result, governance should affect not only the gains of acquisitions but also whether acquisitions take 
place. We find that this is indeed the case. We show across all types of acquisitions that the frequency of 
acquisitions is strongly positively related to the governance of a country. In other words, if a firm is in a 
country with better governance, it makes more cross-border acquisitions. Other country characteristics are 
generally insignificant after controlling for industry and year.  
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature. In Section 3, we explain how 
we construct our sample and how we estimate abnormal returns. We show estimates of the stock-price 
reaction to cross-border and domestic acquisitions in Section 4. In Section 5, we investigate the relation 
between acquiring-firm shareholder gains from cross-border acquisitions and characteristics of the 
acquiring firm’s country using several different approaches. In Section 6, we show that country 
governance is positively related to the frequency of acquisitions. We conclude in Section 7.   
 
2. Review of the literature 
There is a growing literature on cross-border acquisitions. Part of this literature focuses on 
understanding the frequency of such acquisitions. Another part of the literature tries to explain 
shareholder gains. In this brief review, we discuss only the literature addressing control acquisitions by 
publicly traded firms, which is the topic of this paper.   
Early papers on cross-border mergers and acquisitions are more concerned about issues related to the 
benefits of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the value created by international corporate 6 
 
diversification. An early paper by Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) approaches cross-border acquisitions 
from the same perspective as the FDI literature does.
2 It shows that cross-border acquisitions are more 
frequent in R&D intensive industries. The more recent literature on country determinants of mergers and 
acquisitions activity starts with Rossi and Volpin (2004). Like us, they focus on control acquisitions and 
include private firm targets in their sample (22% of their acquisitions have a public company as the 
target). In their analysis of target countries, they find that countries with weaker shareholder protection 
are the targets of fewer cross-border acquisitions. They do not focus on characteristics of acquiring 
countries separately. In their analysis of acquirer/target country pairs, they show that acquirers typically 
come from countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder protection than the targets. 
In contrast to Rossi and Volpin (2004), Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2010) also consider partial acquisitions 
and include in their sample acquisitions made by non-public firms (Karolyi and Liao (2010) show that 
state-related entities are important acquirers as well). Their study shows that firms from countries whose 
currency has appreciated tend to invest in countries whose currency has depreciated. Ferreira, Massa, and 
Matos (2009) show that cross-border acquisitions are more likely to occur in countries where foreign 
institutional investors hold a higher fraction of the local stock market. Finally, Ahern, Daminelli, and 
Fracassi (2010) examine the impact of cultural values on cross-border activity and find that the frequency 
of cross-border acquisitions is lower between pairs of countries that are more culturally distant.  
Papers that investigate stock-price reactions to cross-border acquisitions tend to have two different 
perspectives. Some papers focus on acquirer returns trying to assess whether international corporate 
diversification benefits shareholders and do so often from the perspective of the corporate diversification 
literature. Other papers study instead whether the gains to acquirers or targets are related to country 
characteristics. Many papers focus only on cross-border acquisitions involving a U.S. firm.  
Papers focusing on the benefits of international corporate diversification include Doukas and Travlos 
(1988), who show that firms that enter a new geographic market earn a higher abnormal return. Eun, 
                                                            
2 The paper references many papers in the FDI literature concerned about investment flows that we do not review 
here. 7 
 
Kolodny, and Scheraga (1996) provide evidence that cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets create 
positive synergies. Dos Santos, Errunza, and Miller (2008) look at changes in the diversification discount 
around cross-border acquisitions. They conclude that diversifying cross-border acquisitions destroy value. 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) investigate acquisitions of foreign firms by U.S. firms from 1985 to 
1995. They find that acquirer returns for cross-border acquisitions are lower by about 100 basis points 
than for domestic acquisitions. They attribute this result to transactions that increase the acquirer’s global 
diversification and industry diversification. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) fail to find evidence that target 
premiums can be explained by industry considerations, but they show that premiums are related to 
exchange rate movements, so that the higher premiums they document for acquisitions by foreign firms 
seem to be partly explained by weakness of the dollar.   
Bris and Cabolis (2008) focus on the premium in cross-border acquisitions. Their sample includes 
partial acquisitions. They consider only acquisitions of public companies and do not analyze the returns to 
acquirers. They show that 100 percent control acquisitions of target firms in weak shareholder protection 
countries made by acquiring firms in strong shareholder protection countries result in a higher premium 
than comparable domestic acquisitions in the weak shareholder protection countries. Starks and Wei 
(2004) conclude that takeover premia received by U.S. firms acquired by foreign firms from 1980 to 1998 
are decreasing in the quality of corporate governance in the acquiring country and that acquiring-firm 
returns are increasing in the quality of corporate governance in their country when the acquisition is paid 
for with stock but not otherwise. Kuipers, Miller, and Patel (2003) examine acquisitions of U.S. 
companies by foreign companies. They find that the acquirer’s return increases in the degree of 
shareholder protection in the acquirer’s country, but falls in the product of the degree of shareholder 
protection and the respect of the rule of law, so that shareholder protection does not seem to be related to 
acquirer returns in countries where the respect of the rule of law is high. Martynova and Renneboog 
(2008) find that the three-day announcement return is lower for cross-border acquisitions than for 
domestic acquisitions for acquisitions from European countries. Using indices of the quality of corporate 
governance at the country level, they show that acquisition returns for bidders and targets in cross-border 8 
 
acquisitions are higher when the bidder comes from a country with better corporate governance than the 
target. Burns, Francis, and Iftekhar (2007) examine the role of ADR programs in cross-border 
acquisitions. They find that foreign firms with ADR programs pay less for U.S. targets, but they also 
show that the existence of an ADR program does not offset poor investor protection at home for a foreign 
firm.  
Several recent papers investigate other determinants of acquisition returns besides investor protection 
and corporate governance. Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2009) find, using a sample of acquisitions from 
1986 to 2006, that developed-market acquirers earn 1.16% on average when an emerging-market firm is 
acquired, but do not earn a significant positive abnormal return when acquiring targets in developed 
countries. Their total sample of cross-border acquisitions is slightly more than a third of ours despite 
including acquisitions of minority stakes. They find that acquirer returns increase as respect for the rule of 
law in the acquirer’s country increases relative to the target’s country, but only for control acquisitions. 
Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010) also obtain estimates of abnormal returns for acquirers. They show a 
negative average acquirer return of -0.78% for a sample of 176 acquisitions. They focus on the combined 
return to the acquirer and the target. They conclude that this combined return increases in the foreign 
institutional ownership of the bidder and the foreign institutional ownership of the target. They use 
acquirer insider ownership as a control variable, but do not report the coefficient. Ahearn, Daminelli, and 
Fracassi (2010) investigate the value created by cross-border acquisitions. However, they only pursue that 
investigation focusing on the combined return to the acquirer and the target and do not evaluate whether 
acquirers benefit from cross-border acquisitions. Because of their investigation of combined returns, they 
have a sample of 938 cross-border mergers across 38 countries. The size of this sample is comparable to 
the size of our sample of cross-border acquisitions with public targets. They conclude that the combined 
returns in acquisitions are lower when the countries of the acquirer and the target are more culturally 
distant.   
In summary, the existing literature has mixed results on whether acquirers gain from cross-border 
acquisitions, as the estimated stock-price reaction to cross-border acquisitions is negative in some studies 9 
 
and positive in others. The literature also reaches mixed results on how country and firm characteristics 
are related to the stock-price reaction. For instance, some papers find evidence of an impact of country-
level investor protection for some types of transactions but not for others. Our paper adds to that 
literature, among other reasons, by demonstrating that the return from cross-border acquisitions is 
affected in an economically important way by country governance, globalization, and corporate 
governance.    
 
3. Data  
We discuss first how we construct the sample of acquisitions and then how we estimate abnormal 
returns. In the final part of the section, we describe the firm and country variables we use. 
 
3.1. The sample of acquisitions. 
To obtain our sample of acquisitions, we use the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global Mergers 
and Acquisition database for the merger and acquisition sample.  We begin with collecting data on all 
acquirers and targets in completed deals for control from 1990-2007. We consider only deals for control 
where the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target before the acquisition and more than 50% afterwards. 
We only include deals where the target is public, private, or a subsidiary, and therefore exclude spin-offs, 
recaps, buybacks, self-tenders, or exchange offers.  We delete deals where SDC classifies the target as 
private, yet the stock price information is available. A difficulty with subsidiary targets is that the 
subsidiary could be located in a foreign country but the parent could be located in the same country as the 
acquirer. Since we are investigating how shareholder gains from acquisitions are related to characteristics 
of the country of the target as well as characteristics of the acquirer, we include in our sample only 
subsidiary targets where the ultimate parent’s country is the same as the subsidiary’s country. The initial 
sample includes 45,875 acquisitions. We then limit the sample to public acquirers, which reduces the 
sample to 24,463 acquisitions. As we are only interested in deals that are important investments from the 
acquirer’s perspective, we eliminate all deals where the value of the transaction reported by SDC is less 10 
 
than 1% of the acquiring firm’s market value of equity two days before the announcement.  The deal 
value is only available for 12,393 acquisitions and of these acquisitions only 9,036 have a deal value in 
excess of 1% of the acquiring firm’s market value of equity. Finally, we need stock returns to estimate 
abnormal returns and eliminate an acquirer (target) from the sample if the acquirer (target) is involved in 
multiple acquisitions within a five-day window surrounding the announcement of the deal, which leaves 
us with 8,090 acquisitions. Using the same sample selection criteria for domestic acquisitions yields a 
sample of 29,324 acquisitions.  
Our final sample contains 37,414 deals. Panel A of Table 1 shows how the sample is distributed over 
the sample period. The distribution through time of the domestic deals and cross-border deals differs 
somewhat. Both domestic and cross-border deals are represented disproportionately during the 1998-2000 
merger wave. However, relatively more of the cross-border deals occur after the merger wave and 
relatively fewer occur before the merger wave compared to domestic deals. In particular, 47.34% of the 
cross-border deals occur after 2000, compared to only 41.47% for domestic deals. The correlation 
between the number of deals per year during the sample period for cross-border and domestic deals is 
86%.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows some interesting differences between the industry representation of cross-
border and domestic deals using the ten SIC-based main industry classifications (e.g., Kahle and 
Walkling, 1996). For example, while manufacturing represents the industry with the most domestic and 
cross-border deals, the representation of more than 46.2% for cross-border deals is substantially larger 
than the 27.8% for domestic deals. In contrast, cross-border deals (10.3%), compared to domestic deals 
(23.0%), are much less likely to involve financials, which is likely due to regulatory issues. After 
manufacturing, services represent the largest industry for both domestic and cross-border deals. 
Finally, Panel C shows the distribution of the sample across acquirer nations. While the U.S. accounts 
for more than half of the domestic transactions (55.7%), only 23.3% of the cross-border transactions have 
a U.S. firm as the acquirer. In fact, the U.K. has a slightly higher representation (24.2%) in the cross-
border sample than the U.S. In contrast to the U.S., the U.K. represents a larger fraction of the cross-11 
 
border transactions than of the domestic transactions (17.9 percent). In terms of cross-border transactions, 
the top ten countries in terms of sample representation are respectively U.K., U.S., Canada, Australia, 
France, Sweden, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, and Singapore. These ten countries, out of a total of 
56 countries in the sample with at least one firm making a cross-border acquisition, represent nearly 80% 
of the cross-border deals in our sample. 
 
3.2. Abnormal returns 
Stock returns are obtained from Datastream. All our analysis uses dollar returns. We use SEDOL 
from SDC to merge with Datastream to obtain event returns for the acquirer. SDC reports a Primary 
SEDOL and an Ultimate Parent SEDOL as firm identifiers.  If the primary SEDOL matches to 
Datastream we use the Primary SEDOL, otherwise we use the Ultimate Parent SEDOL.  
Estimating acquirer stock-price reactions across 61 countries presents several challenges. A possible 
approach is to follow the traditional approach carried on for U.S. acquisitions and estimate the market 
model at the country level to estimate abnormal returns over a three-day window. Some of the studies 
discussed in Section 2 do exactly that (e.g., Ahearn, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 2010; Chari, Ouimet, and 
Tesar, 2010). There are two potential problems with such an approach. First, the number of firms differs 
sharply across countries, so that in some countries the acquirer might be an extremely large fraction of the 
market portfolio. For instance, Statoil ASA of Norway acquires North American Oils Sands Corp. Statoil 
ASA’s market capitalization represents 27.80% of the market portfolio of Norway. In such a case, the 
acquirer abnormal return would be pulled to zero because of the weight of the firm in the country market 
portfolio. To account for this issue and to make abnormal returns comparable across countries, we use a 
market model where the proxy for the market return is a proxy for the world market portfolio. Second, an 
acquisition announcement may take place first in the country of the target when the market is closed in 
the country of the acquirer or may take place in the country of the acquirer when the country of the target 
is closed for business. Further, stock market liquidity differs across countries and so do regulations for 
disclosure and stock trading. Differences in microstructure and disclosure could lead to a lag in the extent 12 
 
to which the market reacts to an acquisition in some countries. For instance, during our sample period, 
some countries stop trading in a stock for the day after it has moved by some percentage (i.e., South 
Korea). Consequently, the announcement effect may be spread over several days. To allow for enough 
time to incorporate the announcement information, we use a five-day announcement window instead of a 
more standard three-day window to estimate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR).  
The parameters for the estimation of the market model are estimated over the period starting 205 days 
to 6 days prior to the announcement. We use the world index from Datastream as the regressor in the 
market model.  All event returns are winsorized at the 0.5% level and the 99.5% level.
3 We examine the 
robustness of our average CAR estimates to alternative specifications of the market model. In particular, 
we use the country index for event returns and also implement a method where we use the country index 
only if the country index is available and the market cap of the firm is less than 5% of the total market cap 
of the country index and the world index otherwise. Our estimates of average CARs are not affected by 
these choices. 
 
3.3. Country and firm-level data 
The first group of country-level governance variables includes the anti-self-dealing index (ANTI_SD) 
from Djankov et al. (2008), the anti-directors index (ANTI_DIR) from La Porta et al. (1998) as revised in 
Djankov et al. (2008), and private and public enforcement indices of securities laws 
(SECLAW_PRIVATE; SECLAW_PUBLIC) from La Porta et al. (2006). The literature, including Rossi 
and Volpin (2004), often uses the product of the anti-director rights index and the rule of law index 
(RULE_LAW), which measures the extent to which laws are enforced, from La Porta et al. (1998). This 
product is interpreted in the literature as a measure of shareholder protection (SHARE_PROTECT), and 
we do the same. We use an index from La Porta et al. (1998) measuring the quality of fiscal-year 1990 
annual reports on their disclosure of accounting information (ACCOUNT) and an index of the quality of 
disclosure (JM_DISC) developed by Jin and Myers (2006). We also use the measure of creditor rights 
                                                            
3 We correct for Datastream return errors based on the recommendations in Ince and Porter (2006). 13 
 
(CREDITOR_RIGHTS) from Djankov et al. (2007). While the existing literature on cross-border 
acquisitions has focused on shareholder rights indices, the FDI literature has shown that FDI flows are 
higher towards countries with poorer creditor rights (see Razin and Sadka, 2007). The argument in that 
literature is that foreign investors have more of an advantage over local firms in countries with poor 
creditor rights because they have better access to funding. We would therefore expect acquirer returns to 
be positively related to the creditor rights of the country of the acquired firm and negatively related to the 
creditor rights of the target’s country. We expect that higher values for these indices in the acquirer’s 
country are associated with higher stock-price reactions as better investor protection makes it harder for 
insiders to expropriate investors through the use of acquisitions or from the gains created by acquisitions. 
We would expect the opposite result for the target country’s index if a firm from a country that protects 
investor rights can better export the advantages resulting from better investor protection, for instance by 
having a lower cost of capital. 
For the second group of country-level governance proxies, we use the country-level indicators of 
KKM. These indicators are obtained from combining several hundred individual variables measuring 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, enforcement of the rule of law, 
corruption, and the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government. They vary annually since 1997. We use the index for the year of the acquisition 
announcement or 1997 if the acquisition takes place earlier. We follow Kaufman et al. (2008) and 
consider the mean of the six variables for each country (WDI_GOV_AVG). We also use the scores for 
the control of corruption (CONTROL_CORR), government effectiveness (GOVT_EFFECT), political 
stability (POL_STAB), regulatory quality (REG_QUALITY), rule of law (RULELAW_WGI), and voice 
and accountability (VOICE_ACCT).
4 Again, we would expect acquirer returns to increase with the 
governance indices of the acquirer’s country and decrease with the governance indices of the target’s 
country.  
                                                            
4 Note that RULE_LAW used to create the variable SHARE_PROTECT is different from the RULELAW_WGI 
variable. See the Appendix for a detailed description of these variables. 14 
 
We follow Bhattacharya and Daouk (2003) and define indicator variables equal to one if, 
respectively, insider trading laws (IT_LAW) and enforcement actions of insider trading laws (IT_ENF) 
are in place at least one year prior to the acquisition announcement year and zero otherwise. We would 
expect less insider trading to be associated with higher stock-price reactions in absolute value since the 
element of surprise in acquisition announcements would be higher. 
Other country-level variables measure economic and financial development as well as the 
performance of markets in a country. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2006) show that firm-level governance 
measures are more effective with greater financial and economic development. We include the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP_PCAP) per capita based on the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset 
from the World Bank. GDP per capita is measured in 2007 dollars. Also, we construct a ratio of the 
aggregate market capitalization of the equity of publicly listed companies to the GDP of that country 
(MKTCAP_GDP) and a turnover ratio equal to the ratio of the annual dollar volume to the total market 
capitalization (CRTY_STK_TURNOVER). We would expect firms to be more valuable and to have more 
resources when the domestic market has done well in dollars. Trailing one-year stock returns per country 
(CTRY_RET_1YR) are collected from Datastream. Note that since we are considering dollar returns, a 
country’s stock index could perform well because the country’s stock market increased in value in local 
currency or because the local currency appreciated. Consequently, our stock returns measure subsumes 
the foreign exchange effect that some papers discussed earlier have shown to affect target returns and the 
frequency of cross-border acquisitions. One of the best-known theoretical papers on cross-border 
acquisitions, Adler and Dumas (1975), focuses on the role of such acquisitions in arbitraging barriers to 
portfolio investment. Consequently, we use a measure of such barriers. We would expect acquirers to gain 
more from acquisitions in countries with barriers to international investment and we would expect 
acquirers to have an advantage if they come from a country that has no such barriers. Bekaert (1995) and 
Edison and Warnock (2003) consider a measure based on the ratio of the market capitalization of the 
constituent firms comprising the International Finance Corporate (IFC) Investable Index to those that 15 
 
comprise the IFC Global index for each country (LIB_INTENSITY_AVG). We update this index 
annually, but it does not vary over the sample period for developed countries.  
We use Compustat Global for firm-level characteristics (except for insider ownership for which we 
use Worldscope) and SDC for deal-level characteristics. Firm-level characteristics as well as deal size are 
measured in dollars. Requiring firm-level characteristics reduces our sample by 23%. We are especially 
interested in the issue of whether firm-level governance characteristics reduce the importance of country-
level governance. This is an issue that has been studied extensively in the literature. Doidge, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2007) find an extremely large country-level fixed-effect in firm-level governance for less-
developed countries. We use two firm-level governance measures. First, we use insider ownership from 
Worldscope measured as the percentage of closely held shares relative to the total shares outstanding 
(INSIDEPCT). The theoretical literature shows that one would expect insider ownership to be higher in 
countries with worse investor protection, so that insider ownership would mitigate the adverse impact of 
poor investor protection. La Porta et al. (2002) provide evidence in support of this prediction. The 
limitations of the Worldscope insider ownership data are well-known (see Dahlquist et al., 2003). 
However, there is no substitute for this data that has close to the same coverage.  We also include 
indicator variables for whether non-U.S. acquirers have an ADR program (ADR). The literature shows 
both theoretically and empirically that ADR programs are a way for foreign corporations to rent U.S. laws 
and institutions (see Karolyi (2010) for a review of the literature). 
The Appendix of the paper provides a detailed description of the country-level and firm-level 
variables we use.    
 
4. Gains to shareholders from acquisitions: Domestic versus cross-border acquisitions  
In this section, we assess whether cross-border acquisitions create wealth for acquiring-firm 
shareholders and whether the wealth they create differs from domestic acquisitions. Such an inquiry is 
important both generally and for the investigation of our paper. As discussed in Section 3, there is a large 
literature that assesses the benefits from international diversification at the firm level. One way to assess 16 
 
whether international diversification is valuable is to compare the gains to acquiring-firm shareholders 
from domestic acquisitions to those from cross-border acquisitions. In the context of our study, it is 
important to assess whether shareholders make gains from cross-border acquisitions to better evaluate our 
later results. If stock-price reactions were insignificant across cross-border acquisitions, abnormal returns 
might be too noisy to assess their relation to country characteristics with precision.  
Table 2 shows the estimates for stock-price reactions to domestic and cross-border reactions. Average 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at the one-percent level for all types of acquisitions, except 
for the cross-border acquisitions of public targets paid for with stock, which is significant at the five-
percent level. In our analysis we focus on the results for the full sample and for the following subsamples: 
Public targets paid for with cash, public targets paid for with stock, subsidiary targets paid for with cash, 
private targets paid for with cash, and private targets paid for with stock. We do not provide a separate 
analysis for acquisitions for which the means-of-payment is mixed or unknown, but these acquisitions are 
included in the whole sample analysis. 
For the whole sample, the average stock-price reactions for domestic and cross-border acquisitions 
are astoundingly similar, 1.42% versus 1.50%. Obviously, the difference in the stock-price reaction 
between these two types of acquisitions is not significant. We consider next the stock-price reaction to 
different types of acquisitions. We find that acquisitions of public firms for cash represent 5.20% of the 
domestic acquisitions and 9.30% of the cross-border acquisitions. Perhaps not surprisingly, acquisitions 
of public firms for cash benefit the acquiring-firm shareholders. However, they benefit acquiring-firm 
shareholders significantly more with cross-border acquisitions than with domestic acquisitions. The 
difference in the stock-price reaction between domestic and cross-border acquisitions is 0.56% and is 
significant at the ten-percent level. In contrast, acquisitions of public firms for stock are over three times 
more likely for domestic acquisitions than cross-border acquisitions (7.47% versus 2.30%). This finding 
is not surprising as it is also observed in several of the papers discussed in Section 2. Acquisitions of 
public firms paid for with stock have negative stock-price reactions, whether they are domestic or cross-
border. The average abnormal return for cross-border acquisitions is -2.02% in contrast to the average 17 
 
abnormal return for domestic acquisitions of -1.18%. The difference between the two average abnormal 
returns is not significant.  
All types of acquisitions involving subsidiaries or private firms have significant positive abnormal 
returns. Such a finding is not surprising in light of the existing literature for acquisitions in the U.S. (see 
e.g., Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004, 2005). The frequency of subsidiary acquisitions is similar for 
cross-border acquisitions (19.90%) and domestic acquisitions (21.20%). The average abnormal returns for 
these two types of acquisitions are almost the same at respectively 1.71% and 1.66%. The frequency of 
cross-border acquisitions of private firms for cash is about one third higher than the frequency of 
domestic acquisitions of private firms for cash (32.89% compared to 24.91%). Again, there is no 
meaningful difference in abnormal returns. Finally, as for acquisitions of public firms with stock, 
acquisitions of private firms with stock in cross-border acquisitions are infrequent. Only 4.68% of the 
cross-border acquisitions are acquisitions of private firms paid for with stock, which is roughly half the 
frequency of domestic acquisitions of private firms paid for with stock. The average abnormal return of 
such domestic acquisitions, 2.80%, is insignificantly higher than the average abnormal return for 
comparable cross-border acquisitions, 2.59%.  With the large number of observations, all differences in 
relative frequencies between domestic and cross-border deals for the various sub-samples are significant 
at the one-percent level. 
 
5. Gains to acquiring-firm shareholders and country characteristics  
In this section, we investigate the relation between acquirer shareholder returns and the acquirer’s 
country governance and investor protection characteristics as well as its economic and financial 
development. As Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) show, there are important reasons why firm-level 
governance is more effective when economic development and financial development are higher. 
However, in addition and perhaps more importantly, greater economic development and financial 
development could offer advantages to firms in making cross-border investments as they can draw on 18 
 
better resources if globalization is limited because of cross-country differences as discussed in Stulz 
(2005). For instance, it might be easier for firms from more financially developed countries to raise funds.  
Two important issues need to be addressed before we can proceed to our regression analysis. First, it 
is known that firm and deal characteristics are related to stock-price reactions to acquisitions. For 
instance, we know that acquirer returns fall with acquirer size (see Moeller et al., 2004) and increase with 
acquirer leverage (see, e.g., Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell, 1993). An important issue is therefore 
whether we should control for such characteristics. Second, the literature shows that stock-price reactions 
differ across types of acquisitions. This raises the question of whether we should consider the stock-price 
reactions to all acquisitions in a country or only consider stock-price reactions for each type of 
acquisitions. We explain how we resolve these issues next before turning to regressions. 
The problem with controlling for firm and deal characteristics in regressions that attempt to explain 
the stock-price reaction to acquisitions across countries is that both firm and deal characteristics are 
endogenous to country characteristics. In a U.S. study, all firms have an equal opportunity to choose to 
proceed with a hostile offer or to proceed with a tender offer. However, in a cross-country study, firms in 
some countries will be limited in their ability to choose some deal characteristics. Similarly, firms are 
larger in some countries than others and differences in firm size across countries are often attributed to 
differences in institutions (see Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales, 2002). Yet, we know within the U.S. that 
large firms generally make acquisitions that have lower stock-price reactions. Hence, controlling for size, 
we might reach a different conclusion about the impact of institutions on the gains from acquisitions, but 
we would then ignore that part of the effect of institutions might work through size. We therefore choose 
to focus on regressions that have purely exogenous variables. In these regressions, the variables are 
country characteristics and indicator variables for a firm’s industry and its calendar year. We then discuss 
which results are affected when we control for firm and deal characteristics. Specifically, at the deal level 
we control for relative size, whether the deal is classified as hostile, whether the deal is classified as a 
tender offer, and the worldwide liquidity of the market of the assets of the target (see e.g., Schlingemann 
et al., 2002). Our firm-level control variables include the natural logarithm of the market value of the 19 
 
acquirers’ equity two days prior to the announcement, Tobin’s Q (defined as the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is the book value of assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity), the operating cash flow divided by the book value 
of assets, and the market value measure of leverage (debt divided by the market value of assets).  
As already discussed, acquisition returns are positive and significant for acquisitions of private 
companies and negative and significant for acquisitions of public companies paid for with equity. 
Consequently, if a country’s firms make relatively more cross-border acquisitions of public firms paid for 
with equity, the stock-price reaction to acquisitions, everything else equal, will be worse in that country. 
This outcome raises a concern. There is a substantial literature that shows that firms that pay for 
acquisitions with equity signal to the market that their equity is overvalued (see e.g., Moeller et al., 2007). 
As a result, conditional on the market assessing the equity’s value correctly, an acquisition might increase 
shareholder wealth even though the stock-price reaction is negative. This issue would suggest looking at 
acquisition types separately. However, this approach also suffers from a problem, which is that 
acquisition types are most likely endogenous to country characteristics since there is evidence (discussed 
in Section 2) that investors are reluctant to accept shares in payment for an acquisition when the shares 
trade in a country with poor governance.   
A constant issue with research using country characteristics is that many of these country 
characteristics tend to be highly correlated, so that multicollinearity may make it difficult to assess the 
effect of independent variables in multiple regressions. We therefore start in Section 5.1. with estimating 
regressions with one country characteristic at a time, while controlling for calendar year and the industry 
of the acquirer. Next, in Section 5.2, we turn to regression analysis where we use multiple country 
characteristics for the bidder and the target in the same specification to assess whether a country 
characteristic is significant in Section 5.1. because it proxies for other country characteristics. In all 
regressions, we use the country characteristic for the acquiring firm as well as the same characteristic for 
the target. This approach allows us to assess how target country characteristics affect acquirer returns, but 
it also makes sure that if there is strong correlation among target and acquirer country characteristics, our 20 
 
assessment of the relation between acquirer returns and acquirer country characteristics is not biased. 
Finally, we cluster the residuals by country.  
 
5.1. Regressions using one country characteristic at a time 
The regression estimates are presented in Table 3. For each country characteristic, we show the 
coefficient on the country characteristic for the acquirer’s country and for the target’s country, as well as 
the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared of the regression. The first three country 
characteristics we consider are, respectively, the anti-self-dealing index (ANTI_SD), the anti-director 
index (ANTI_DIR), and the product of the anti-director index and the rule of law index 
(SHARE_PROTECT). We find no evidence that these indices are associated with acquirer returns for the 
whole sample. However, acquirer returns for cash acquisitions of public firms increase as the anti-self-
dealing index of the acquirer country increases and as the anti-self-dealing index of the target country 
decreases. This pattern that a country characteristic has opposite effects depending on whether it is a 
characteristic of the acquirer’s country or of the target’s country is observed a number of times in the 
table. The coefficients are economically significant as a one standard deviation increase in the anti-self-
dealing index is associated with an increase in the abnormal return of almost half a percentage point. The 
negative relation between abnormal returns and the anti-self-dealing index for acquisitions of public firms 
paid for with equity raises the possibility that a higher governance country has a higher quality 
information environment, so announcements of equity offers have greater signaling value. The anti-self-
dealing index of the acquirer’s country is not significant for other acquisition types. Acquirers gain more 
from acquisitions in countries where the anti-director index is lower for acquisitions of public firms paid 
for with equity and is insignificant for the whole sample and all other types of acquisitions. Acquirer 
returns fall with the anti-director index of the target’s country for the whole sample. Finally, we find that 
the product (SHARE_PROTECT) of the anti-director index and the rule of law index is never significant.  
There is no evidence that the creditor rights index (CREDITOR_RIGHTS) is correlated with acquirer 
returns. Interestingly, strong creditor rights in the target country are associated with lower gains for the 21 
 
acquiring firm, a finding that is consistent with the predictions of Razin and Sadka (2007). They argue 
that acquirers have an advantage if they have cheaper access to funds than firms in the target country 
because of better creditor rights in their home country. The securities law indices (SECLAW_PRIVATE; 
SECLAW_PUBLIC) are not related to the acquirer gains at all. The final index we consider in this group 
of indices typically associated with investor protection is an index of accounting transparency 
(ACCOUNT). We find that the index of the acquirer country is positively associated with acquirer gains 
and the index of the target is negatively associated with these gains for acquisitions of public firms for 
cash. We also use the quality of disclosure index (JM_DISC) of Jin and Myers (2006). The coefficient on 
that index is never significant for acquirer returns (not reproduced in the table).  
After considering indices that are related to investor protection, we turn to the World Bank 
governance indicators. The first index we consider is related to the control of corruption 
(CONTROL_CORR).  We find that acquirers from countries that control corruption better gain more 
from acquisitions for the whole sample and for cash acquisitions of public firms; further, acquirers gain 
more for the whole sample and for cash acquisitions of public firms when the target country controls 
corruption less. We obtain similar results using World Bank governance indicators for government 
effectiveness (GOVT_EFFECT), political stability (POL_STAB), regulatory quality (REG_QUALITY), 
rule of law (RULELAW_WGI), and voice (VOICE_ACCT). Not surprisingly, therefore, we also find 
these results when using the average governance index (WDI_GOV_AVG). The standard deviation of the 
average governance index across the whole sample is 0.369. As a result, an increase of one standard 
deviation in the average governance index increases the stock-price reaction to cash acquisitions of public 
firms by 66 basis points and increases the stock-price reaction for the whole sample by 23 basis points. 
Another way to evaluate the economic significance of a change in the average governance index for the 
acquirer’s country is that an increase of one standard deviation increases the acquirer’s gain by 14.97% 
for the whole sample and by 60.65% for acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash. 
We then consider two variables that measure, respectively, whether a country has a law limiting 
insider trading (IT_LAW) and whether that law is enforced (IT_ENF). Acquirer country enforcement has 22 
 
a positive significant coefficient for the whole sample while target country enforcement has a negative 
significant coefficient for the whole sample. The only significant coefficient for the existence of a law is a 
negative significant coefficient for the indicator for the acquirer’s country for stock acquisitions of public 
firms. A possible explanation for this result is that the signaling effect of an offer to acquire a public firm 
for stock might be stronger in countries with less leakage due to insider trading.  
The next four variables are related to the economic and financial situation of the country of the 
acquirer and target. We find no evidence that GDP per capita (GDP_PCAP) is related to acquirer gains in 
acquisitions, which might appear surprising in light of the findings of Chari et al. (2010). However, 
emerging countries have a number of common characteristics, so that acquirer returns from acquisitions 
in such countries might be higher because they have lower country governance rather than because they 
have lower GDP per capita. Greater stock market capitalization of the acquiring country 
(MKTCAP_GDP) is unrelated to acquisition gains except for a negative coefficient for acquisitions of 
private firms paid for with equity. The stock market capitalization of the target country has a negative 
coefficient for the whole sample. Stock market turnover of the acquirer’s country 
(CTRY_STK_TURNOVER) has a positive coefficient for acquisitions of public firms paid for with 
equity and a negative coefficient for acquisitions of subsidiaries. The target’s country stock market 
turnover is never significant. We then use a country’s stock return in the year preceding the acquisition 
(CTRY_RET_1YR). This variable is never significant for the country of the acquirer; the stock return of 
the country of the target has a positive significant coefficient for stock acquisitions of public firms. Lastly, 
we consider the impact of the liberalization intensity index (LIB_INT_AVG). In interpreting the results 
for this variable, it is important to be aware that relatively few countries in the sample have acquisitions 
made when their liberalization intensity index is below one (only four acquisitions of public firms paid for 
with equity and only 40 acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash). The index has a positive 
significant coefficient for acquisitions of public firms, but a negative significant coefficient for 
acquisitions of subsidiaries. The coefficient is not significant for other types of acquisitions. This 
evidence would suggest that acquirers of countries with no barriers to international portfolio investment 23 
 
have higher returns when they acquire public firms. The index for the target country is not significant 
except for acquisitions of private firms paid for with equity. The Adler and Dumas (1975) theory would 
imply that acquirers would gain more from acquisitions in countries that have barriers to international 
investment. None of our results are consistent with that prediction.  
Finally, we consider regressions with firm governance characteristics. We find that acquirer abnormal 
returns increase significantly with insider ownership (INSIDE_PCT) for the whole sample and all 
acquisition types but acquisitions of private firms. The standard deviation of insider ownership across our 
sample is 23.16%. As a result, a one standard deviation increase in insider ownership increases the stock-
price reaction by 27 basis points for the whole sample and by 59 basis points for the sample of 
acquisitions of public firms for cash. Roughly, therefore, the impact on the stock-price reaction of a one 
standard deviation increase in insider ownership is approximately the same as the impact of a one 
standard deviation increase in the average country governance index. Restricting the sample to foreign 
firms only, we use an indicator variable for whether a firm has an ADR program (ADR). For the whole 
sample, the existence of an ADR program is negatively associated with the acquirer return and positively 
associated with the existence of an ADR program for the target firm. Acquirers of public firms with ADR 
programs have marginally lower returns (p-value of 0.10) when they make acquisitions financed with 
equity using the sample of non-U.S. acquirers and targets. This result may simply reflect the better 
information environment of ADR firms (e.g., Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva, 2006), so that issuance of equity 
has more signaling value.  
 
5.2. Regressions using multiple country characteristics 
We now turn to multiple regressions. The concern with the regressions of Table 3 is that country 
governance could derive its significance from its correlation with other variables. Further, we know from 
our earlier discussion that there are good reasons for financial development and economic development, 
which are correlated with country governance, to affect abnormal returns. For instance, even though GDP 
per capita is not significant in Table 3, it could be that country governance is significant only because it 24 
 
partly proxies for GDP per capita. We therefore estimate regressions with country governance where we 
control for economic and financial development. Our proxy for economic development is GDP per capita; 
the proxy for economic development is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. We see in Panel A 
of Table 4 that, when controlling for economic and financial development, country governance remains 
significant for the whole sample and for cash acquisitions of public firms, but also becomes significant for 
private firm acquisitions paid for with cash.  
The regression estimates of model (1) are for the whole sample and show that country governance 
remains significant when we control for financial and economic development. It is interesting to note that 
while GDP per capita is not significant in Table 3, GDP per capita of the target country is positive and 
significant for the whole sample in Table 4. This is further evidence that acquisitions in emerging markets 
may have higher acquirer returns not because these countries are poorer, but because they have poorer 
governance.  
We estimate the same regression for each type of acquisition in models (2) to (6) of Panel A of Table 
4. The coefficient on country governance of the acquiring firm is significantly positive for acquisitions of 
public and private firms paid for with cash. The country governance of the target firm is significantly 
negative for acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash and of private firms paid for with equity. GDP 
per capita of the target has a positive significant coefficient for acquisitions of subsidiaries and 
acquisitions of private firms. There is no evidence that acquirers gain more from acquisitions in countries 
with lower GDP per capita. 
Though we do not reproduce the results in a table, we also investigate regressions where we use 
accounting transparency (ACCOUNT), the securities law index (SEC_LAW), and the anti-self-dealing 
index (ANTI_SD). In these regressions, accounting transparency of the acquirer has a positive significant 
coefficient and accounting transparency of the target country has a negative significant coefficient for the 
whole sample. Further, the anti-self-dealing index of the acquirer’s country has a significant negative 
coefficient and the coefficient on securities laws of the target is significantly positive. The negative 
coefficient on the anti-self-dealing index is solely due to acquisitions of public firms paid for with equity. 25 
 
In another set of regressions, we use as country characteristics the country stock market return, the index 
of political stability, and the level of GDP as a proxy for country size. We find that the country return of 
the target is positively significant and the political stability of the target is negatively significant. The 
coefficient on the country return of the target is driven by acquisitions of public firms paid for with stock.  
We re-estimate the regressions of Table 4 with the product of the anti-director index and the rule of 
law index (SHARE_PROTECT) for both the target and acquirer added as explanatory variables, but do 
not report these regressions in a table. For the whole sample, the coefficient on SHARE_PROTECT is 
insignificant for the acquirer’s country and for the target’s country.  The acquirer’s country coefficient is 
negative and significant in acquisitions of public firms for equity. The target’s country coefficient is 
positive and significant in acquisitions of private firms for cash.  
Table 3 shows that bidder insider ownership is positively related to bidder returns. We re-estimate the 
regressions of Panel A of Table 4 with insider ownership of the acquirer (INSIDE_PCT) as an 
explanatory variable. Doing so reduces the size of the whole sample by a quarter. Yet, as shown in Panel 
B of Table 4, the coefficients on the country governance indices are significant and the ownership 
variable has a coefficient of 0.0149 that is significant at the one-percent level for the whole sample. The 
coefficient on insider ownership is positive and significant for all types of acquisitions except acquisitions 
of private firms. The coefficient on acquirer-country governance is positive and significant in all cases 
except for acquisitions of public firms paid for with equity and of subsidiaries.  
Since La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002), the literature has examined whether 
insider ownership mitigates the adverse impact of poor laws or poor country governance. We find some 
evidence (but do not tabulate it) that greater insider ownership reduces the adverse impact of worse 
country governance. We estimate regressions with acquirer country governance, acquirer insider 
ownership, and an interaction between insider ownership and country governance. If insider ownership 
mitigates the adverse impact of poor country governance, we expect that interaction to have a negative 
coefficient. For acquisitions of private firms, we find that all three coefficients – i.e., the signs on 
ownership, governance, and the interaction – have the predicted sign.  For the whole sample and the 26 
 
acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash, all three variables have the predicted sign, but the 
interaction is never significant. We repeat the exercise with the anti-director index. The interaction is 
negative and significant only for acquisitions of public firms with equity. In all other cases, the interaction 
is insignificant.     
We next estimate all the regressions discussed so far controlling for the firm and deal characteristics 
described earlier. We do not report these regressions in a table. We lose about one quarter of observations 
in the regressions that use these characteristics. For the whole sample, we find that the acquisition return 
increases in the relative size of the acquisition, falls in the size of the acquirer, and falls if the acquisition 
is a tender offer.  The results are consistent with results for U.S. domestic acquisitions and therefore firm 
and deal characteristics do not appear to play a significantly different role for cross-border acquisitions. 
For the various types of acquisitions, the signs of these coefficients are generally consistent, but not 
always significant. No other deal or firm characteristic is consistently significant. The estimates for the 
country characteristics are generally consistent with the estimates discussed earlier, but they sometimes 
lose significance as firm characteristics are correlated with country characteristics for reasons discussed 
earlier.  
 
6. How important are countries in acquirer returns?   
We turn to assessing the economic importance of global versus country effects. We have seen that the 
country governance of the acquiring (target) firm is positively (negatively) related to the acquirer return 
and these results are economically significant. In these regressions, we use as regressors year and industry 
indicator variables as well as country characteristics. We therefore investigate the relative explanatory 
power of year and industry indicator variables compared to country characteristics. Because the 
coefficients on year and industry indicator variables are determined globally, we consider them to 
represent global factors in the determination of acquirer returns.   
In Table 5, we present regressions using year, industry, and country indicator variables for the whole 
sample and for each acquisition type. By definition, the coefficient of the acquirer country indicator 27 
 
variable measures the impact of the acquirer’s country on the acquisition return. We are interested in the 
explanatory power of the indicator variables. This is best measured by the R-squared of regressions that 
have different subsets of these explanatory variables. We estimate five regressions for each sample: 
calendar year dummies only, country dummies only, industry dummies only, target country dummies 
only, and all indicator variables in one regression. We only include countries and industries with five 
acquisitions at least. We only show the R-squared of each regression, the p-value for an F-test of the joint 
significance of the indicator variables, and the number of observations. The first set of regressions in 
Table 5 is for the sample as a whole. It is immediately apparent that together the year of an acquisition 
and the industry of the acquirer explain more than the country of the acquirer. However, the country of 
the target explains about the same as all these variables together. It follows that the global effects 
dominate the acquirer country effects.  
We estimate the same regressions for each type of acquisition as well. In all cases except for 
acquisitions of private firms paid for with cash, year and industry indicator variables explain more than 
acquirer country indicator variables. Further, it is always the case that the country of the target is more 
informative than the country of the acquirer. Strikingly, for acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash 
none of the sets of indicator variables are significant. For acquisitions of public firms paid for with stock, 
the industry indicator variables are jointly significant. The year, industry, and target country indicator 
variables are each jointly significant for acquisitions of subsidiaries, but the acquirer country indicator 
variables are not jointly significant. Similar results hold for acquisitions of private firms for cash. Finally, 
with acquisitions of private firms for equity, the indicator variables for the acquirer’s country are jointly 
significant, but the year and industry indicator variables are not significant. 
Another way to identify the existence of a global effect on acquirer returns is as follows. For each 
sample, we measure the average acquirer return for acquisitions made in other countries in the same year. 
We then estimate a regression of acquirer returns on the acquirer returns for the same type of acquisitions 
in other countries during the same year, which we refer to as GLOBAL_EFFECT. The results for this 
analysis are reported in Table 6. The coefficient on GLOBAL_EFFECT is positive and significant for the 28 
 
whole sample and for the sub-samples of acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries. For the whole 
sample, a one standard deviation increase in the average acquirer CAR outside a country leads to an 
increase in the average CAR in the country of 24 basis points. The coefficient is insignificant for 
acquisitions of public firms. These results show that the acquirer gains in a given year are higher when the 
gains made on similar acquisitions by acquirers in other countries are higher, so that there is a global 
factor in the gains from acquisitions. The regression models in Table 6 include industry indicator 
variables (not reported), but the results are robust to excluding these. 
 
7. How important are countries in cross-border acquisition intensity?   
We have shown that country governance has an economically significant effect on the returns from 
cross-border acquisitions. We have also shown that global effects play an important role in acquirer 
returns. In this section, we examine whether country governance affects the frequency of acquisitions in 
our sample. The sample we have used so far requires the deal value to be known. As we saw, this sample 
reduces the sample size considerably. To evaluate the determinants of the frequency of acquisitions, this 
sample suffers from a selection bias. Therefore, we consider in this section a sample of acquisitions that 
does not require deal value to be reported in SDC as well as the restricted sample we have considered so 
far. The less restrictive sample includes acquisitions by private firms as well, but it only includes control 
acquisitions, so our results are not directly comparable with those of studies that include partial 
acquisitions. This sample is much larger as it includes 45,875 acquisitions. Slightly more than 21,412 of 
these acquisitions are by private firms.     
We estimate regressions of the frequency of acquisitions relative to the number of listed firms in a 
country (effectively, the number of firms with returns on Datastream). Since these regressions are 
estimated using country-level data, we cannot use the industry indicator variable and therefore we only 
use calendar year indicator variables as our global variables. We use as our country variables the country 
governance index, GDP per capita, the index for liberalization intensity, the index for securities laws, the 29 
 
anti-self-dealing index, the country’s market capitalization to GDP ratio, and the country’s stock return in 
the previous year. We report the results in Table 7.   
The first regression uses the sample without restrictions. We find a very strong effect of the country 
governance index (WDI_GOV_AVG) on the frequency of cross-border acquisitions. In contrast, none of 
the other variables are significant. Though we do not reproduce the results in the table, we also estimate 
model (1) without GDP per capita and without the country governance index. The country governance 
index has roughly the same coefficient when GDP per capita is not included in the regression. When the 
country governance index is not included, GDP per capita is significant at the 5% level with a coefficient 
of 0.0035. These results suggest that when the country governance index is not included in the regression, 
GDP per capita proxies for that index. Strikingly, when we omit the country governance index the 
adjusted R-squared drops from 0.43 to 0.30. In contrast, it essentially does not change when we omit GDP 
per capita. We also estimate the model without year indicator variables. When we do so, the coefficient 
on the country governance index is not affected. None of the other variables are significant.  Model (2) is 
for the acquisitions that meet the sample requirements of the earlier section. We see again that the country 
governance index is the only significant variable. However, the coefficient on that index is much lower.  
Again, GDP per capita has no explanatory power. We then estimate the regressions for the different 
acquisition types omitting the GDP per capita. The governance index is significant with a positive 
coefficient in each of the regression specifications. The stock market capitalization variable is significant 
and positive for acquisitions of public firms for cash. Finally, the country return is not significant for 
acquisitions of private firms and subsidiaries when we omit the year indicator variables (not reported in 
the table). The year indicator variables explain much less for acquisitions of subsidiaries and private firms 
paid for with cash. The adjusted R-squared falls by more than half when these variables are omitted for 
acquisitions of public and private firms paid for with stock. Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared falls by 
almost 40% for acquisitions of public firms paid for with cash. 30 
 
These regressions show that the country governance is an important determinant of control-
acquisition frequency. It affects all types of acquisitions and no other widely used country characteristic is 
significant in our sample.     
 
8. Conclusion   
In this paper, we examine how the gains to shareholders from investments are related to country and 
firm-level governance using a sample of cross-border acquisitions from 61 countries from 1990 to 2007. 
We find that the gains to acquirers increase with the acquirer’s country governance and fall with the 
target’s country governance. Further, firms in countries with better country governance make more 
acquisitions. In addition, the stock-price reaction to acquisition announcements increases with the 
acquirer’s insider ownership but, to some extent, more so in countries with weaker governance. Whereas 
our governance variables have an economically significant relation with acquirer returns showing that 
firms benefit from better country governance, we find no evidence that other country characteristics have 
a reliable systematic relation with acquirer returns across acquisition types.  However, both the 
accounting transparency and the anti-self-dealing indices are positively related to the stock-price reaction 
to cash acquisitions of public firms and the coefficient estimates are highly significant.  
Though country governance is an important determinant of stock-price reactions to acquisition 
announcements, we find that the importance of country characteristics is surprisingly limited. In 
particular, the year of an acquisition and the industry of an acquirer typically explain more of the 
abnormal return than the country of the acquirer. Since the coefficients on year and industry indicator 
variables are estimated across the whole sample, they reflect global factors. We find further evidence that 
global factors influence stock-price reactions in that acquirers in a country earn less through acquisitions 
of private firms and subsidiaries when acquirers in other countries earn less as well. All this evidence 
points to the fact that the market for cross-border acquisitions is a global market, but acquirers from 
countries with better governance have an intrinsic advantage in that market.  31 
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Appendix – Variable definitions and sources 













Index created by the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research to rate the quality of 1990 annual reports on their disclosure 


















Indicator variable equal to one if the firm has a “dscode” listed in 
Datastream and has an ADR and equal to zero if firm has dscode, but 
does not have an ADR. Value is set to missing if firm does not have a 































Revised version of the Anti-Directors Index from La Porta et al. 
(1998) with values from 0-6.  The index is formed by adding one 
when (i) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to 
the firm, (ii) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior 
to the general shareholders’ meeting, (iii) cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is 
allowed, (iv) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (v) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call 
for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 
10% (the sample median), or (vi) shareholders have preemptive rights 























































ANTI_SD  Anti-self dealing index. Source: La Porta et al. (2006).  Both  No  Country  2003 
CREDITOR_RIGHTS 
 
Creditor rights aggregate score based on 129 countries' private credit. 
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Appendix – Continued 














Gross domestic product per capita measured in 2007 US dollars. 




















Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies. Source: Kauffman et al. (2009) and World 






























Indicator variable equal to one if the acquisition announcement year is 
after the first year that insider trading laws were put into place in the 



























The disclosure index as defined in Jin and Meyers (2006). The index 
is defined at the country level and updated for missing sample 
countries based on the same methodology as in Jin and Myers (2006) 
using the Global Competitiveness Reports for 1999 and 2000. Higher 
values for the index measure more transparency. The index is based 
on the average scoring on two survey questions regarding the level 
and effectiveness of financial disclosure across the sample years 1999 















































The intensity measure is based on the ratio of the market 
capitalization of the constituent firms comprising the IFC Investable 
index to those that comprise the IFC Global index for each country. 
The IFC Global index, subject to some exclusion restrictions, is 
designed to represent the overall market portfolio for each country, 
whereas the IFC Investable index is designed to represent a portfolio 
of domestic equities that are available to foreign investors. A ratio of 
one means that all of the stocks are available to foreign investors (see 







































Appendix – Continued 














Ratio of market capitalization of listed domestic stocks in a country 


















Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. Source: Kauffman et al. 
























Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by 
the risk-rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). The index is 
based on the average of the months of April and October of the 
monthly index and averaged for the years 1982 to 1995. The index 
































Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. Source: Kauffman et al. (2009) and World 






























Measure of the effective rights of minority shareholders. This variable 
is the product of ANTI_DIR and RULE_LAW divided by ten so that 























The private enforcement index is the arithmetic mean of their 
disclosure index and burden of proof index.  Following LaPorta et al. 
(2004), measures of private enforcement are the most associated with 
























Appendix – Continued 















The public enforcement index is the mean of supervisor 
characteristics index, investigative powers index, orders index and 
criminal index. Following La Porta (2004), measures of public 
enforcement are at best modestly associated with market 


































Voice and Accountability measures the extent to which country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
Source: Kauffman et al. (2009) and World Governance Indicators  


























Country average of the 6 governance variables CONTROL_CORR, 
GOVT_EFFECT, RULE_LAW_WGI, POLITICAL_STAB, 
REG_QUALITY, and VOICE_ACCT. Source: Kauffman et al. 






















This table reports summary statistics for the full sample of 37,414 takeover deals, collected from the 
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global Mergers and Acquisition database by announcement year 
[Panel A], main industry classification based on Kahle and Walking (1996) [Panel B], and acquirer 
nation [Panel C]. 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year








1990 554 1.89% 221 2.73% 775 2.07%
1991 603 2.06% 153 1.89% 756 2.02%
1992 796 2.71% 156 1.93% 952 2.54%
1993 1058 3.61% 174 2.15% 1232 3.29%
1994 1367 4.66% 266 3.29% 1633 4.36%
1995 1420 4.84% 299 3.70% 1719 4.59%
1996 1825 6.22% 401 4.96% 2226 5.95%
1997 2397 8.17% 503 6.22% 2900 7.75%
1998 2542 8.67% 632 7.81% 3174 8.48%
1999 2309 7.87% 657 8.12% 2966 7.93%
2000 2292 7.82% 798 9.86% 3090 8.26%
2001 1690 5.76% 585 7.23% 2275 6.08%
2002 1570 5.35% 433 5.35% 2003 5.35%
2003 1542 5.26% 397 4.91% 1939 5.18%
2004 1850 6.31% 536 6.63% 2386 6.38%
2005 1993 6.80% 626 7.74% 2619 7.00%
2006 2000 6.82% 655 8.10% 2655 7.10%
2007 1516 5.17% 598 7.39% 2114 5.65%
Total 29324 100.00% 8090 100.00% 37414 100.00%
Panel B: Sample Distribution per Industry








AGRICULTURE 166 0.57% 32 0.40% 198 0.53%
MINING 1837 6.27% 431 5.33% 2268 6.06%
CONSTRUCTION 520 1.77% 86 1.06% 606 1.62%
MANUFACTURING 8161 27.83% 3739 46.23% 11900 31.81%
TRANSPORTATION, ETC 2438 8.31% 528 6.53% 2966 7.93%
WHOLESALE TRADE 1174 4.00% 300 3.71% 1474 3.94%
RETAIL TRADE 1326 4.52% 159 1.97% 1485 3.97%
FINANCIALS 6739 22.98% 829 10.25% 7568 20.23%
SERVICES 6929 23.63% 1979 24.47% 8908 23.81%
GOVERNMENT, REGULATED 31 0.11% 4 0.05% 35 0.09%
Total 29321 100.00% 8087 100.00% 37408 100.00%39 
 









Argentina 28 0.10% 1 0.01% 29 0.08%
Australia 1,537 5.24% 393 4.86% 1,930 5.16%
Austria 7 0.02% 43 0.53% 50 0.13%
Bahamas 0 0.00% 5 0.06% 5 0.01%
Belgium 32 0.11% 65 0.80% 97 0.26%
Belize 0 0.00% 4 0.05% 4 0.01%
Bermuda 3 0.01% 29 0.36% 32 0.09%
Brazil 82 0.28% 10 0.12% 92 0.25%
British Virgin 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.00%
Canada 1,522 5.19% 863 10.67% 2,385 6.37%
Cayman Islands 0 0.00% 3 0.04% 3 0.01%
Chile 28 0.10% 13 0.16% 41 0.11%
China 194 0.66% 15 0.19% 209 0.56%
Colombia 4 0.01% 2 0.02% 6 0.02%
Czech Republic 3 0.01% 2 0.02% 5 0.01%
Denmark 56 0.19% 103 1.27% 159 0.42%
Finland 130 0.44% 116 1.43% 246 0.66%
France 258 0.88% 263 3.25% 521 1.39%
Germany 113 0.39% 215 2.66% 328 0.88%
Gibraltar 0 0.00% 1 0.01% 1 0.00%
Greece 32 0.11% 15 0.19% 47 0.13%
Guernsey 0 0.00% 1 0.01% 1 0.00%
Hong Kong 223 0.76% 113 1.40% 336 0.90%
Hungary 3 0.01% 9 0.11% 12 0.03%
Iceland 1 0.00% 1 0.01% 2 0.01%
India 83 0.28% 84 1.04% 167 0.45%
Indonesia 3 0.01% 1 0.01% 4 0.01%
Ireland-Rep 67 0.23% 222 2.74% 289 0.77%
Isle of Man 0 0.00% 7 0.09% 7 0.02%
Israel 34 0.12% 102 1.26% 136 0.36%
Italy 224 0.76% 112 1.38% 336 0.90%
Japan 1,111 3.79% 140 1.73% 1,251 3.34%
Jersey 1 0.00% 5 0.06% 6 0.02%
Liechtenstein 0 0.00% 1 0.01% 1 0.00%
Luxembourg 0 0.00% 8 0.10% 8 0.02%
Malaysia 429 1.46% 82 1.01% 511 1.37%
Malta 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.00%
Mexico 39 0.13% 23 0.28% 62 0.17%
Neth Antilles 0 0.00% 3 0.04% 3 0.01%
Netherlands 73 0.25% 198 2.45% 271 0.72%
New Zealand 76 0.26% 36 0.44% 112 0.30%
Norway 123 0.42% 114 1.41% 237 0.63%
Peru 6 0.02% 0 0.00% 6 0.02%
Philippines 52 0.18% 9 0.11% 61 0.16%
Poland 21 0.07% 2 0.02% 23 0.06%
Portugal 30 0.10% 19 0.23% 49 0.13%
Puerto Rico 3 0.01% 7 0.09% 10 0.03%
Russian Fed 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.00%
Singapore 205 0.70% 167 2.06% 372 0.99%
South Africa 265 0.90% 71 0.88% 336 0.90%
South Korea 105 0.36% 34 0.42% 139 0.37%
Spain 150 0.51% 99 1.22% 249 0.67%
Sri Lanka 3 0.01% 0 0.00% 3 0.01%
Sweden 238 0.81% 257 3.18% 495 1.32%
Switzerland 35 0.12% 115 1.42% 150 0.40%
Taiwan 49 0.17% 29 0.36% 78 0.21%
Thailand 51 0.17% 10 0.12% 61 0.16%
Turkey 9 0.03% 1 0.01% 10 0.03%
Ukraine 0 0.00% 8 0.10% 8 0.02%
United Kingdom 5,241 17.87% 1,955 24.17% 7,196 19.23%
United States 16,333 55.70% 1,884 23.29% 18,217 48.69%
Venezuela 6 0.02% 0 0.00% 6 0.02%
Total 29,324 100.00% 8,090 100.00% 37,414 100.00%
Domestic Cross Border Combined
Panel C: Sample Distribution per Acquirer Nation40 
 
Table II 
Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns 
This table provides mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) measured from two days 
prior to two days after the acquisition announcement for the sample of domestic [A] and 
cross-border [B] deals. CAR is calculated using the market model, where the parameters 
are estimated over the period starting 205 days to 6 days prior to the announcement using 
the world index from Datastream as the regressor in the market model.   All event returns 
are winsorized at the .5% and 99.5% level. The number of observations [N] and CAR are 
reported for the full sample and the following subsamples: Public targets paid for with cash, 
public targets paid for with stock, subsidiary targets paid for with cash, private targets paid 
for with cash, and private targets paid for with stock. The mean difference in CAR between 
domestic and cross-border deals is reported with its p-value, where * indicates significance 














Domestic [A] 29,324 1.42% 1,524 0.53% 2,190 -1.18%
Cross Border [B] 8,090 1.50% 752 1.08% 186 -2.02%
Total 37,414 1.44% 2,276 0.71% 2,376 -1.24%
[A] - [B] -0.08% -0.56%* 0.85%











Domestic [A] 5,834 1.66% 7,306 1.24% 2,831 2.80%
Cross Border [B] 1,715 1.71% 2,661 1.39% 379 2.59%
Total 7,549 1.67% 9,967 1.28% 3,210 2.77%
[A] - [B] -0.06% -0.14% 0.21%
p-value 0.783 0.435 0.781
Subsidiary | Cash Private | Stock Private | Cash
All Public | Cash Public | Stock41 
 
Table III 
Single Country-Characteristic Regression Analysis 
This table reports for each country characteristic listed and defined in the Appendix, the regression 
coefficient on the country characteristic for the acquirer’s country and for the target’s country, the p-value 
for the coefficient [in brackets], the number of observations [N], and the adjusted R-squared [AR2] of an 
ordinary least squares regression. Each regression includes besides one country characteristic at a time, 
controls for calendar year and the main industry classifications from Kahle and Walkling (1996) of the 
acquirer. Regression residuals are clustered by country. Statistical significance of the country 
characteristic regression coefficient is denoted with ***, **, or * for p-values less than one percent, five 
percent, and ten-percent respectively. 42 
 
















ANTI_SD Acquirer -0.0027 0.0209* -0.0621* -0.0072 -0.0030 -0.0050
[0.571] [0.073] [0.075] [0.290] [0.609] [0.889]
-0.0044 -0.0240** 0.0636 -0.0091 0.0110** -0.0451***
Target [0.155] [0.031] [0.113] [0.143] [0.024] [0.006]
N=7796 N=714 N=177 N=1668 N=2561 N=357
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.004 AR2=-0.047 AR2=0.004 AR2=0.006 AR2=0.033
ANTI_DIR Acquirer -0.0013 0.0037 -0.0120* -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0017
[0.258] [0.220] [0.099] [0.977] [0.930] [0.780]
-0.0027** -0.0044 0.0077 -0.0026 0.0015 -0.0269**
Target [0.029] [0.111] [0.453] [0.103] [0.134] [0.023]
N=7796 N=714 N=177 N=1668 N=2561 N=357
AR2=0.006 AR2=0.007 AR2=0.028 AR2=0.007 AR2=0.006 AR2=0.046
SHARE_PROTECT Acquirer 0.0005 0.0031 -0.0104 -0.0008 0.0008 0.0035
[0.733] [0.224] [0.182] [0.648] [0.648] [0.714]
-0.0001 -0.0022 0.0041 -0.0003 0.0014 0.0044
Target [0.865] [0.332] [0.382] [0.755] [0.189] [0.429]
N=7508 N=695 N=174 N=1628 N=2432 N=345
AR2=0.006 AR2=0.011 AR2=0.027 AR2=0.008 AR2=0.009 AR2=0.008
CREDITOR_RIGHTS Acquirer -0.0015 0.0016 -0.0049 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0085
[0.172] [0.567] [0.199] [0.456] [0.438] [0.210]
-0.0022** -0.0026 -0.0006 -0.0019* -0.0021 -0.0161**
Target [0.016] [0.242] [0.938] [0.054] [0.195] [0.044]
N=7838 N=715 N=176 N=1674 N=2583 N=363
AR2=0.005 AR2=-0.003 AR2=-0.062 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.006 AR2=0.043
SECLAW_PRIVATE Acquirer 0.0050 0.0034 -0.0432 0.0039 0.0056 0.0288
[0.599] [0.708] [0.224] [0.687] [0.669] [0.560]
0.0018 0.0001 0.0051 0.0038 0.0108 0.0574**
Target [0.692] [0.990] [0.842] [0.383] [0.182] [0.029]
N=7508 N=695 N=174 N=1628 N=2432 N=345
AR2=0.003 AR2=-0.004 AR2=-0.060 AR2=0.003 AR2=0.007 AR2=0.021
SECLAW_PUBLIC Acquirer 0.0065 0.0088 -0.0485 0.0002 0.0100 -0.0025
[0.331] [0.324] [0.201] [0.972] [0.314] [0.945]
0.0042 -0.0002 0.0344 0.0038 0.0073 0.0597
Target [0.255] [0.982] [0.190] [0.405] [0.163] [0.122]
N=7508 N=695 N=174 N=1628 N=2432 N=345
AR2=0.003 AR2=-0.003 AR2=-0.056 AR2=0.003 AR2=0.007 AR2=0.020
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ACCOUNT Acquirer 0.0002 0.0015*** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0011
[0.342] [0.000] [0.944] [0.664] [0.460] [0.533]
-0.0002** -0.0007*** 0.0020 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0017*
Target [0.023] [0.007] [0.185] [0.112] [0.634] [0.057]
N=7176 N=675 N=166 N=1567 N=2322 N=336
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.020 AR2=-0.062 AR2=0.006 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.015
CONTROL_CORR Acquirer 0.0048* 0.0118*** -0.0011 0.0012 0.0032 0.0175
[0.053] [0.003] [0.960] [0.776] [0.291] [0.372]
-0.0035*** -0.0063** -0.0164 -0.0040 0.0002 -0.0154
Target [0.002] [0.034] [0.496] [0.175] [0.894] [0.184]
N=7991 N=742 N=182 N=1699 N=2629 N=372
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.007 AR2=-0.056 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.021
GOVT_EFF Acquirer 0.0064** 0.0193*** -0.0213 -0.0018 0.0061 0.0261
[0.025] [0.001] [0.426] [0.718] [0.142] [0.339]
-0.0037*** -0.0074** -0.0126 -0.0031 -0.0001 -0.0099
Target [0.005] [0.024] [0.604] [0.418] [0.977] [0.530]
N=7991 N=742 N=182 N=1699 N=2629 N=372
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.013 AR2=-0.055 AR2=0.004 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.018
POL_STAB Acquirer 0.0036 0.0096** 0.0031 0.0013 0.0044 0.0038
[0.216] [0.025] [0.879] [0.825] [0.208] [0.857]
-0.0048** -0.0040 0.0443** -0.0055 -0.0007 -0.0320*
Target [0.041] [0.275] [0.042] [0.351] [0.682] [0.064]
N=7992 N=742 N=182 N=1700 N=2629 N=372
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.001 AR2=-0.039 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.026
REG_QUALITY Acquirer 0.0011 0.0169*** -0.0567* -0.0053 -0.0000 0.0088
[0.597] [0.008] [0.051] [0.314] [0.993] [0.709]
-0.0044*** -0.0089** -0.0192 -0.0019 0.0014 -0.0165
Target [0.010] [0.044] [0.618] [0.650] [0.592] [0.444]
N=7992 N=742 N=182 N=1700 N=2629 N=372
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.007 AR2=-0.044 AR2=0.004 AR2=0.004 AR2=0.017
RULELAW_WGI Acquirer 0.0050* 0.0150*** -0.0055 -0.0009 0.0028 0.0257
[0.085] [0.001] [0.773] [0.878] [0.482] [0.328]
-0.0037** -0.0058 -0.0206 -0.0019 0.0000 -0.0179
Target [0.011] [0.102] [0.589] [0.576] [0.988] [0.272]
N=7992 N=742 N=182 N=1700 N=2629 N=372
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.006 AR2=-0.056 AR2=0.004 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.021
Table III - Continued44 
 
 
















VOICE_ACCT Acquirer 0.0064* 0.0117* 0.0154 -0.0006 0.0024 0.0408*
[0.088] [0.086] [0.694] [0.907] [0.590] [0.064]
-0.0046** -0.0080 -0.0146 0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0162
Target [0.019] [0.165] [0.588] [0.773] [0.839] [0.220]
N=7986 N=742 N=182 N=1699 N=2625 N=372
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.002 AR2=-0.056 AR2=0.003 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.027
WDI_GOV_AVG Acquirer 0.0061* 0.0178*** -0.0108 -0.0007 0.0043 0.0295
[0.077] [0.001] [0.695] [0.908] [0.326] [0.360]
-0.0047*** -0.0083** -0.0043 -0.0029 -0.0000 -0.0205
Target [0.006] [0.044] [0.899] [0.489] [0.998] [0.233]
N=7992 N=742 N=182 N=1700 N=2629 N=372
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.008 AR2=-0.058 AR2=0.004 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.022
IT_LAW Acquirer 0.0044 -0.0045 -0.0640*** 0.0128 -0.0356*** 0.0681**
[0.469] [0.690] [0.001] [0.286] [0.000] [0.012]
-0.0063 -0.0258 0.0081 -0.0028 -0.0110 0.0393
Target [0.282] [0.139] [0.469] [0.692] [0.105] [0.314]
N=7866 N=727 N=180 N=1680 N=2582 N=364
AR2=0.003 AR2=-0.000 AR2=-0.062 AR2=0.004 AR2=0.008 AR2=0.026
IT_ENF Acquirer 0.0059** 0.0030 0.0100 0.0066 0.0020 0.0159
[0.040] [0.617] [0.558] [0.194] [0.684] [0.543]
-0.0056*** -0.0112 -0.0323 -0.0034 -0.0002 -0.0357
Target [0.003] [0.163] [0.216] [0.531] [0.958] [0.166]
N=7866 N=727 N=180 N=1680 N=2582 N=364
AR2=0.004 AR2=-0.000 AR2=-0.057 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.006 AR2=0.030
GDP_PCAP Acquirer -0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0006
[0.673] [0.282] [0.303] [0.153] [0.374] [0.590]
0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
Target [0.914] [0.824] [0.682] [0.735] [0.117] [0.857]
N=7939 N=729 N=182 N=1688 N=2610 N=373
AR2=0.003 AR2=-0.001 AR2=-0.063 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.007 AR2=0.014
MKTCAP_GDP Acquirer 0.0005 0.0076 -0.0081 0.0027 0.0008 -0.0341**
[0.787] [0.228] [0.659] [0.273] [0.778] [0.027]
-0.0032** -0.0079* 0.0343* -0.0030 -0.0001 -0.0077
Target [0.019] [0.054] [0.085] [0.252] [0.964] [0.534]
N=7793 N=721 N=176 N=1657 N=2564 N=362
AR2=0.004 AR2=0.003 AR2=-0.048 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.035
























CTRY_TURNOVER Acquirer -0.0025 0.0006 0.0279* -0.0107*** -0.0052 0.0015
[0.308] [0.901] [0.059] [0.001] [0.164] [0.936]
0.0011 0.0005 0.0061 0.0026 0.0008 0.0157
Target [0.616] [0.917] [0.641] [0.509] [0.837] [0.435]
N=7827 N=727 N=179 N=1659 N=2575 N=365
AR2=0.004 AR2=-0.001 AR2=-0.051 AR2=0.009 AR2=0.006 AR2=0.019
CTRY_RET_1YR Acquirer 0.0001 -0.0108 0.0426 0.0050 -0.0013 -0.0025
[0.982] [0.572] [0.224] [0.619] [0.911] [0.922]
0.0070 0.0076 0.0818** 0.0001 0.0067 0.0307
Target [0.140] [0.591] [0.034] [0.995] [0.464] [0.538]
N=7422 N=668 N=173 N=1597 N=2410 N=339
AR2=0.004 AR2=-0.006 AR2=-0.048 AR2=0.003 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.026
LIB_INT_AVG Acquirer -0.0234 0.1462*** 0.0752** -0.0797* -0.0058 -0.1341
[0.348] [0.000] [0.043] [0.076] [0.678] [0.268]
-0.0150 -0.0405 6.4232 -0.0193 0.0008 0.1339***
Target [0.339] [0.324] [0.482] [0.575] [0.948] [0.000]
N=7275 N=660 N=174 N=1586 N=2343 N=330
AR2=0.006 AR2=0.014 AR2=0.019 AR2=0.014 AR2=0.011 AR2=0.024
INSIDE_PCT Acquirer 0.0116*** 0.0256** 0.1012** 0.0133* 0.0056 -0.0196
[0.001] [0.022] [0.017] [0.066] [0.322] [0.647]
N=6398 N=628 N=138 N=1380 N=2078 N=260
AR2=0.005 AR2=0.001 AR2=-0.024 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.002 AR2=0.041
ADR Acquirer -0.0079*** -0.0106** -0.0359 0.0017 -0.0056 0.0298**
[0.000] [0.044] [0.122] [0.708] [0.125] [0.015]
0.0084** 0.0122 -0.0269* 0.0089** 0.0000 0.0000
Target [0.013] [0.226] [0.065] [0.045] [.] [.]
N=8060 N=747 N=184 N=1709 N=2654 N=379
AR2=0.005 AR2=0.003 AR2=-0.038 AR2=0.006 AR2=0.005 AR2=0.022
Table III - Continued46 
 
Table IV 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
This table presents the regression coefficients for OLS regression models where the 
dependent variable is the acquirer return and the independent variables are measures for 
governance, financial development, and economic development (see Appendix for 
definitions) in Panel A and the same regressions with insider ownership in Panel B. Each 
regression includes industry indicator variables based on the main industry classifications 
from Kahle and Walking (1996). Regression residuals are clustered by country. Statistical 
significance of the regression coefficients is denoted with ***, **, or * for p-values less 
than one percent, five percent, and ten-percent respectively. 47 
 



















VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WDI_GOV_AVG acquirer 0.0076** 0.0196** 0.0088 0.0022 0.0128** 0.0296
[0.038] [0.029] [0.802] [0.724] [0.018] [0.319]
WDI_GOV_AVG target -0.0096*** -0.0141** 0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0016 -0.0700***
[0.000] [0.047] [0.854] [0.126] [0.587] [0.001]
GDP_PCAP acquirer -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0006*** 0.0002
[0.128] [0.281] [0.343] [0.202] [0.004] [0.810]
GDP_PCAP target 0.0004*** 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0004* 0.0002* 0.0023*
[0.007] [0.323] [0.409] [0.086] [0.051] [0.062]
MKTCAP_GDP acquirer 0.0005 0.0069 -0.0118 0.0040 0.0022 -0.0369**
[0.797] [0.153] [0.636] [0.167] [0.401] [0.023]
MKTCAP_GDP target -0.0038** -0.0066 0.0421* -0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0057
[0.012] [0.179] [0.092] [0.159] [0.176] [0.640]
Observations 7787 718 176 1656 2562 362


















VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WDI_GOV_AVG acquirer 0.0088** 0.0198** -0.0211 0.0011 0.0155*** 0.1107**
[0.011] [0.039] [0.516] [0.885] [0.002] [0.042]
WDI_GOV_AVG target -0.0090*** -0.0214** 0.0301 -0.0079** -0.0033 -0.0610**
[0.000] [0.020] [0.428] [0.032] [0.280] [0.019]
GDP_PCAP acquirer -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0023 -0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0001
[0.276] [0.402] [0.106] [0.836] [0.001] [0.946]
GDP_PCAP target 0.0004*** 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0005** 0.0004* 0.0023
[0.003] [0.100] [0.920] [0.022] [0.055] [0.136]
MKTCAP_GDP acquirer 0.0028* 0.0077 0.0032 0.0049* 0.0057** -0.0279
[0.089] [0.191] [0.908] [0.071] [0.036] [0.153]
MKTCAP_GDP target -0.0051** -0.0054 0.0305 -0.0051 -0.0053** -0.0042
[0.010] [0.177] [0.324] [0.190] [0.025] [0.757]
INSIDE_PCT 0.0149*** 0.0277** 0.1230*** 0.0157** 0.0083 -0.0182
[0.000] [0.048] [0.000] [0.014] [0.253] [0.701]
Observations 6199 609 134 1337 2009 251
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.019 -0.032 0.019 0.006 0.06548 
 
Table V 
Explanatory Power of Indicator Variable Regressions 
This table reports the R-squared, p-value for an F-test of the joint significance of the 
indicator variables, and the number of observations (N) in regressions for the whole 
sample (All) and each sub-sample. Models (1) through (5) exclusively include 
respectively calendar year, acquirer country, industry, target country, and all 
indicator variables in one regression. We only include countries and industries with 
five acquisitions at least. 
 
  
A l l ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Indicators Year Country (A) Industry Country (T) All
R-squared 0.0050 0.0060 0.0040 0.0190 0.0330
Prob > F 0.0003 0.2130 0.0003 0.0219 0.0001
Observations 8060 8060 8060 8060 8060
Public | Cash ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Indicators Year Country (A) Industry Country (T) All
R-squared 0.024 0.023 0.012 0.095 0.154
Prob > F 0.4510 0.9120 0.2570 0.2720 0.5000
Observations 721 721 721 721 721
Public | Stock ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Indicators Year Country (A) Industry Country (T) All
R-squared 0.065 0.012 0.097 0.143 0.336
Prob > F 0.8420 0.9740 0.0097 0.5530 0.4400
Observations 153 153 153 153 153
Subsidiary | Cash ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Indicators Year Country (A) Industry Country (T) All
R-squared 0.016 0.020 0.009 0.081 0.119
Prob > F 0.0716 0.218 0.0540 <0.0001 <0.0001
Observations 1685 1685 1685 1685 1685
Private | Cash ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Indicators Year Country (A) Industry Country (T) All
R-squared 0.011 0.017 0.005 0.041 0.071
Prob > F 0.0253 0.1310 0.0948 0.0771 0.0177
Observations 2641 2641 2641 2641 2641
Private | Stock ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )
Indicators Year Country (A) Industry Country (T) All
R-squared 0.063 0.075 0.006 0.203 0.296
Prob > F 0.1750 0.0087 0.8220 0.0143 0.0398
Observations 350 350 350 350 35049 
 
Table VI 
Global Effect Regressions 
This table presents the regression coefficients for OLS regression models where the 
dependent variable is the acquirer return and the independent variable is the average 
acquirer return for acquisitions of the same type made in other countries in the same year 
(GLOBAL_EFFECT). Each regression includes industry indicator variables based on the 
main industry classifications from Kahle and Walking (1996). Regression residuals are 
clustered by country. Statistical significance of the regression coefficients is denoted with 



















( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
GLOBAL_EFFECT 0.4878** -0.4900 0.4529 0.4452* 0.5471*** 0.7130***
[0.028] [0.333] [0.349] [0.086] [0.008] [0.000]
Constant 0.0101 0.0203 -0.0018 -0.0104 0.0010 0.1489***
[0.181] [0.276] [0.572] [0.269] [0.942] [0.000]
Observations 8041 747 183 1705 2648 378




This table presents the coefficients and p-values for OLS regression models where the dependent variable 
is the frequency of acquisitions relative to the number of listed firms in a country (based on the number of 
firms with return data on Datastream). Variable definitions are in the Appendix. Model (1) is for the 
unrestricted sample from SDC including cases with missing deal values and private acquirers. Models (2) 
through (7) use the sample of deals by public acquirers for which deal value is available. Each regression 
includes calendar year indicator variables (not reported). N is the number of observations based on 
country-year observations. Statistical significance of the regression coefficients is denoted with ***, **, 

























VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WDI_GOV_AVG 0.1138*** 0.0122* 0.0015*** 0.0004*** 0.0037*** 0.0041*** 0.0007***
[0.005] [0.100] [0.000] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDP_PCAP -0.0009 0.0001
[0.690] [0.741]
LIB_INT_AVG -0.0150 0.0015 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0012 0.0018 -0.0005
[0.632] [0.836] [0.504] [0.501] [0.509] [0.490] [0.366]
SECLAW -0.0367 -0.0022 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0008 0.0005
[0.376] [0.833] [0.702] [0.636] [0.787] [0.809] [0.226]
ANTI_SD -0.1114 0.0155 -0.0031* 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0054 0.0003
[0.281] [0.544] [0.075] [0.601] [0.951] [0.458] [0.654]
MKTCAP_GDP 0.0179 -0.0003 0.0010*** 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000
[0.355] [0.954] [0.007] [0.668] [0.886] [0.899] [0.925]
CTRY_RET_1YR 0.0096 0.0024 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004
[0.498] [0.410] [0.311] [0.725] [0.594] [0.904] [0.621]
N 502 502 502 502 502 502 502
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.217 0.191 0.068 0.163 0.145 0.131